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1. Introduction
Though constituting one of the cornerstones of the system of private international law rules on matters of 
contractual obligations, the parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to their contracts is not entirely 
unlimited. In addition to targeted protection in favour of those parties regarded as being weaker,*2 along 
with specifi c limitations for purely internal contracts,*3 the Rome I Regulation (Rome I)*4 includes an over-
all clause allowing the courts of EU member states the possibility to refuse to apply a provision of the 
foreign law either chosen by the parties or otherwise applicable to the contract on grounds of manifest 
incompatibility with its public policy (ordre public).*5 
Other than this general public policy exception, Rome I provides for a similar instrument – overall 
mandatory provisions of the law of the forum state.*6 Both serve the purpose of safeguarding the fundamen-
tal principles of the forum country whilst, however, operating differently. Overall mandatory provisions 
embody and protect the state’s public interests in a ‘positive’ manner, inasmuch as they are to be applied 
regardless of the content of the law otherwise applicable to the contract. Therefore, they do not necessarily 
1 This article was published with support from ESF Grant No. 9209.
2 Contracts in favour of passengers, consumers, insurance contracts’ policy-holders, and employees – see Articles 5, 6, 7, and 
8 of Rome I, respectively.
3 Contracts pertaining to situations wherein all elements relevant to the situation are located in one country – see Article 3 
(3) and (4) of Rome I.
4 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I). – OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6 ff. It replaces the Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations of June 1980. The consolidated text of that convention is found in OJ C 334, 30.12.2005, p. 1 ff.
5 Article 21 of Rome I. In this paper, the notions of public policy and ordre public are used in parallel in denotation of the 
public policy clause of Article 21.
6 Provisions of the forum state that are to be applied to the contract irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the con-
tract – see Article 9 (1) and (2) of Rome I.
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constitute a barrier to the application of foreign law.*7 By contrast, the general public policy exception per-
forms a negative function as it counteracts certain provisions of foreign law by excluding their application.*8
Recent developments in the EU’s second-generation regulations on the enforcement of judgements 
from other Member States seem to point to a certain decline in the importance of the public policy clause in 
private international law, by abolishing in part the public policy exception and the exequatur in general.*9 
In addition, continuous harmonisation of substantive law related to the EU internal market indicates that 
the need for a public policy exception may be ostensibly diminishing.*10 These trends constitute incentive to 
investigate whether the role of an overall public policy clause in matters of contractual obligations should be 
reconsidered as well, particularly as these are not as value-sensitive as other areas of civil law and in account 
also of the existence of special rules on overriding mandatory provisions in Rome I. What is more, the word-
ing of the public policy exception in itself is vague, thereby complicating its application while simultane-
ously entailing broad judicial discretion.
This article explores the employment of the public policy exception from the perspective of Rome I, 
which determines the law applicable to contractual obligations for 27 European Union member states.*11 
Only the substantive-law aspects and not the enforcement-stage protection of public policy shall therefore 
be the focus of this paper. The article starts by examining the preconditions for applying the public policy 
clause. It then analyses the relativity of ordre public, developing three dimensions to be considered in the 
courts’ use of the public policy exception in a particular case. In its conclusions, the article answers the 
question of why, notwithstanding its infrequent application, dispensing with the public policy exception 
would be unthinkable. Given that the essence of public policy differs from state to state, it should be stated 
here that the subsequent analysis and the examples provided are applicable in the context of Estonia’s legal 
order and based on its fundamental values. 
2. Prerequisites for recourse to the public policy clause 
Rome I, in its Article 21, uses the ‘standard’ wording of the public policy clause. Ever since the Hague Con-
vention of 24 October 1956 on the law applicable to maintenance obligations toward children,*12 similar – 
if not quasi-identical – wording has been employed in numerous private international law cross-border 
instruments for the public policy clause, including other EU regulations, along with most Hague Conven-
7 For in-depth analysis of the concept of overriding mandatory provisions, see, for example, R. Piir. Eingreiffen oder nicht 
eingreiffen, das ist hier die Frage. Die Problematik der Bestimmung und des Anwendungbereichs der Eingriffsnormen im 
internationalen Privatrecht. – Juridica International 2010/XVII, p. 199 ff.
8 More on the distinction between positive and negative functions can be found in such works as R. Hausmann. Art. 21 
Rome I. – U. Magnus (ed.). J. Von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und 
Nebengesetzen. Einführungsgesetz zum BGB/IPR. Art 11-29 Rom I-VO; Art 46b, c EGBGB (Internationales Vertragsrecht 
2). Berlin: Sellier 2011 (in later notes, ‘Staudinger/Hausmann’), paragraph 2; D. Martiny. Art. 21 Rom I. – J. von Hein (ed.). 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. Band 10. Internationales Privatrecht I. Europäisches Kollision-
srecht. Ein führungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Art. 1-24). Munich: C. H. Beck 2015 (in later notes, ‘Münchener 
Kommentar / Martiny’), paragraph 7.
9 See J. Kramberger Škerl. European public policy (with an emphasis on exequatur proceedings). – Journal of Private 
International Law 2011/7, p. 482. For a more in-depth analysis of the abolition of exequatur in the second-generation 
regulations in general, see, for example, S. Pabst. A.I.3 EG-Vollstreckungstitelverordnung. Einleitung. – T. Rauscher (ed.). 
Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR. Cologne: Verlag Otto Schmidt 2015, paragraph 12; M. Torga. 
Brüsseli I (uuesti sõnastatud) määrus: kas põhjalik muutus Eesti rahvusvahelises tsiviilkohtumenetluses? (‘The Brussels I 
Regulation (recast): A thorough change in the Estonian Civil Procedure?’). – Juridica 2014/4, p. 311 (in Estonian). The term 
‘second-generation regulations’ is used here to indicate Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 creating a European enforcement 
order for uncontested claims. – OJ L 143, 21.4.2004, p. 15 ff.; Regulation (EC) No. 861/2007 establishing a European small 
claims procedure. – OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 1 ff.; Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment 
procedure. – OJ L 399, 30.12.2006, p. 1 ff.; Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations. – OJ L 7, 10.1.2009, p. 1 ff.; and 
Regulation (EC) No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (recast). – OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1 ff. These are not considered in this article.
10 M. Stürner. Europäisierung des (Kollisions-)Rechts und nationaler ordre public. – Grenzen überwinden – Prinzipien 
bewahren. Festschrift für Berndt von Hoffmann. Bielefeld, Germany: Verlag Ernst und Werner Gieseking 2011, p. 482.
11 Denmark, having an opt-out from implementing regulations under the area of freedom, security, and justice, still adheres to 
the Rome Convention, which was replaced by Rome I in 2009 and which provided almost the same rules on party autonomy 
as does Rome I.
12 Convention of 24 October 1956 on the law applicable to maintenance obligations towards children, Article 4. Available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=37 (most recently accessed on 25 March 2015).
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tions in this fi eld. Because of the continuing need to formulate the preconditions for its application in a 
rather broad manner in order to preserve its universal character, the wording used by Rome I has remained 
unaltered in comparison to the predecessor of this provision – Article 16 of the former Rome Convention. 
According to the explicit stipulation of Article 21, the preconditions for recourse to the public policy clause 
are the application of a foreign law to the case and the manifest incompatibility of the result with the public 
policy of the forum.
2.1. Application of foreign law
The ‘safety net’ concept of the public policy exception in private international law (i.e., its aim of refraining 
from obliging the court to give effect to foreign-law provisions that are counter to the fundamental prin-
ciples of the forum state) makes it clear that public policy constitutes reason for intervention only in cases 
wherein the law applicable to the contract (lex contractus) is not that of the forum (lex fori) but a foreign 
law.*13 Accordingly, whether the applicable law has been determined through a choice of law or by virtue of 
the general confl ict rules makes no difference. Thus, in cases wherein a court has to apply its domestic law, 
EU law, or international treaties, it is not the public policy clause of Article 21 but the domestic law provi-
sions that have to avoid possibly unfair results.*14 The public policy exception therefore applies only in cases 
in which the applicable law has been designated in accordance with the confl ict rules in Rome I and it is not 
the lex fori that governs the case.
The applicable law itself is not criticised. Even though it is imaginable that a foreign law provision as 
such may seem contrary to the forum’s public policy, its inapplicability per se without further consideration 
is very problematic.*15 As a general rule, determination of the contents of the foreign law must always be 
carried out even before consideration of making use of the public policy clause.*16 Hence, it must be noted 
that intervention via the public policy exception can never be applied ‘upon suspicion’ or on grounds of 
simple assumption of a confl ict between the public policy of the forum and a foreign law provision substan-
tially deviating from the lex fori.*17 
Determination of the content and objective of the lex contractus, also called the preliminary examina-
tion phase,*18 serves as no more than an initial basis on which to decide whether or not to apply the public 
policy exception. The decisive factor here is the outcome as a whole of the application of the foreign law 
provision in specifi c circumstances, also called the thorough examination phase.*19 It could, for instance, 
be conceivable that the application of a provision that is seemingly contrary to the public policy of the 
forum leads to an acceptable result and that said provision could, therefore, nevertheless be applied.*20 By 
13 P. Kaye. The New Private International Law of Contract of the European Community. Aldershot 1993, p. 345; A. Chong. 
The public policy and mandatory rules of third countries in international contracts. – Journal of Private International Law 
2006/2, p. 30. 
14 J. von Hein. Art. 6 EGBGB. – J. von Hein (ed.). Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. Band 10. Inter-
nationales Privatrecht I. Europäisches Kollisionsrecht. Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Art. 1-24). 
Munich: C. H. Beck 2015 (in later notes, ‘Münchener Kommentar / von Hein’), paragraph 123.
15 Doctrinal literature points out that only foreign laws violating the core content of public policy – e.g., universally recognised 
human rights and the international ius cogens – should be held inapplicable regardless of the circumstances and results of 
their application. See C. Renner. Art. 21 Rome I. – G.-P. Calliess (ed.). Rome Regulations: Commentary on the European 
Rules of the Confl ict of Laws. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International BV 2011 (in later notes, ‘Calliess/Renner’), p. 320, 
paragraph 10; D. Bureau, H. Muir Watt. Droit international privé/I, 3rd edition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 
2014, p. 535.
16 K. Thorn. Art. 6 EGBGB. – P. Bassenge, U. Diederichsen (eds.). Palandt Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. Munich 2009 (in later 
notes, ‘Palandt/Thorn’), paragraph 5. See also R. Jankelevitš. Avalik kord ja imperatiivsed sätted rahvusvahelises eraõiguses 
(Public policy and imperative norms in private international law). – Juridica 2002/7, p. 481 (in Estonian).
17 Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 118.
18 D. Bureau, H. Muir Watt (see Note 15), p. 533. D. Bureau and H. Muir Watt divide the application of the public policy into 
three phases – namely, examination, confrontation, and decision phases (phases d’examen, de confrontation et de décision), 
and the examination phase into preliminary and thorough examination phases.
19 See also Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 118 ff.; G. Kegel, K. Schurig. Internationales Privat-
recht. Ein Studienbuch. Munich: C. H. Beck 2004, section 16 II; P. Kaye (see Note 13), p. 347; Calliess/Renner (see Note 15), 
p. 320, paragraph 11.
20 M. Voltz. Art. 6. – D. Heinrich (ed.). J. Von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz 
und Nebengesetzen. Einführungsgesetz zum BGB/IPR. Art 3-6 EGBGB (IPR – Allgemeiner Teil). Berlin: Sellier 2013 (in 
later notes, ‘Staudinger/Voltz’), paragraph 125.
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way of example, the fact that a foreign law does not prescribe limits on interest rates would not justify its 
non-application on the grounds of public policy as long as the interest rate agreed upon in the case at hand 
would not be usurious according to the domestic public policy standard.*21 An inverse situation, wherein a 
foreign law in the abstract does not seem to contradict public policy yet its application produces an unfair 
result, could also be imaginable, although presumably only in highly exceptional cases.*22 What is more, in 
order to assess the outcome as a whole, one may have to take into consideration a wider legal context. Thus, 
even the absence of a legal provision in foreign law could lead to a result contradictory to the public policy 
of the forum.*23 
2.2. Manifest incompatibility with the public policy of the forum
2.2.1. Interpretative uncertainty as to the criterion ‘manifest’
The thorough examination phase brings us to the next expressly stated prerequisite to resorting to public 
policy – the manifest incompatibility of the result with the public policy of the forum. This second precon-
dition, considered in what is called the confrontation phase, requires the court to fi nd special grounds for 
upholding an objection to application of foreign law to the contract.*24 
The formulation used in Rome I does not itself give much assistance as to its application in a given case, 
although the appending of ‘manifest’ is supposed to impose a restrictive interpretation of the provision.*25 
Indeed, when compared to an imaginable ‘simple’ incompatibility, its scope of application could theoreti-
cally be seen as somewhat more limited.*26 In practice, however, the provision does not provide any specifi c 
guidelines as to its application. In consequence, the interpretation of the criterion of manifest incompat-
ibility remains subject to case-by-case analysis.
It is important to establish in this context that this precondition must be interpreted very restrictively 
if one is to ensure its high substantive threshold and to impose the condition that only serious breaches 
would justify intervention by way of this exceptional clause.*27 Illustrating this, the German Federal Court 
of Justice recently had reason to underscore the importance of this condition (referred to as Offensichtlich-
keitskriterium) anew, explaining that the mere infringement of substantive law without a violation of the 
core principles of the state is not enough to justify recourse to public policy.*28 The European Court of 
Justice too has been strict on the matter, when interpreting the limits of a Member State’s right of recourse 
to public policy, judging that it can be ‘envisaged only where [the result of applying foreign law] would be 
at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State […] inasmuch as it infringes a fun-
damental principle’ and that ‘the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law 
regarded as essential in the legal order of the State […] or of a right recognised as being fundamental within 
that legal order’.*29 
21 See B. Audit. Droit International Privé, 4th edition. Paris 2006, paragraph 838; Calliess/Renner (see Note 15), p. 321, 
paragraph 11. See also M. Giuliano, P. Lagarde. Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations. – 
OJ C 282, 31.10.1980, p. 1 ff., Article 16.
22 D. Bureau, H. Muir Watt (see Note 15), p. 535.
23 Palandt/Thorn (see Note 16), paragraph 47 ff.; Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 120.
24 M. Giuliano, P. Lagarde (see Note 21), Article 16.
25 See, in this sense, the reasoning in the legislative proposal of the German Introductory Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz 
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche). – BT-Drucks, 10/504, p. 42. See also Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), paragraph 128 ff.
26 Nevertheless, in spite of it referring to manifest incompatibility, it has been called a largely declaratory statement. See 
R. Plender, M. Wilderspin. The European Private International Law of Obligations. Sweet & Maxwell 2009, paragraph 
12-057; Calliess/Renner (see Note 15), p. 328, paragraph 36.
27 Ibid.; P. Kaye (see Note 13), p. 348.
28 Bundesgerichtshof, 28.01.2014. – III ZB 40/13, Rn. 3 und 4.
29 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 28 March 2000, Case C-7/98, D. Krombach v. A. Bam-
berski, paragraph 37. – ECR 2000, I-1935, although given in the context of international civil procedure.
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2.2.2. Problematics of determining the nature of the breach 
The question of how to judge whether applying the lex contractus produces results manifestly incompatible 
with the forum’s public policy is not an easy one to answer. It can be predicted, however, that, because the 
law of obligations is mainly of a dispositive nature, breaches of public policy should remain rather scarce 
in practice.*30 In this light, it can be argued that applying foreign law could not be considered contrary to 
public policy for instance in cases wherein domestic law would allow clauses in standard terms that pro-
duce similar results.*31 Or, by way of another example, a mere difference between statutes of limitations in 
two legal systems could not be considered intolerable and therefore manifestly in breach of public policy. 
In contrast, complete absence of a statute of limitations for certain claims or a limitation period so short 
that it would not allow a creditor to protect his interests in practice, or – inversely – so long that the debtor 
remains exposed to possible claims for an unreasonably long period could prompt recourse to the public 
policy exception.*32 
In determination of the manifest nature of the breach, ‘test’ questions such as whether the legislator of 
the forum country would ever consider regulating the case at hand in a similar way or whether such a regu-
lation would be legal and compliant with constitutional rights in the lex fori might also prove helpful.*33 For 
instance, the execution of contracts involving corruption or deception of third parties, as well as contracts 
promoting sexual immorality, might be rejected by the forum for reason of breach of its core principles.*34 
The same would apply for cases wherein the applicable law would lead to the expropriation of intellectual 
property rights when a licence contract for a trade mark is not renewed upon expiry of its term.*35
As far as the point in time for evaluating the incompatibility requirement is concerned, the view is com-
monly held that the critical point when one is judging whether the result of applying a provision of the lex 
contractus is compatible with the public policy of the forum is, in principle, the date of the court decision*36: 
‘Public policy is the policy of the day’ (C.K. Allen).*37 An issue-by-issue approach, inherent to public policy, 
does, however, enable the particular circumstances to be taken into account, thereby allowing a deviation 
from this principle in, for example, the case of contracts with continuous obligations.*38
3. Relativity of public policy 
Interpreting the ‘enshrined’ prerequisites for employing recourse to public policy is challenging in its own 
right; however, the main diffi culty in application of Article 21 of Rome I lies in its relativity. Because of the 
exceptional character of public policy and its reliance on the substantive outcome of applying foreign law 
to the case at hand, several interdependent factors are to be considered when one is deciding whether this 
provision should come into play (i.e., in the decision phase*39). The public policy clause is indeed a provision 
that will never be complete. Therefore, in order to abrogate a confl ict-of-law rule that designates a foreign 
law as the lex contractus, a certain connection between the specifi c case and the forum state is needed. This 
interdependency is best evidenced through analysis of the relative nature of public policy, which is most 
usefully discussed under three sub-categories, covering the temporal; material; and, most importantly, 
 territorial relativity (proximity) of public policy.*40
30 See also Münchener Kommentar / Martiny (see Note 8), paragraph 2.
31 See, with this sense, also Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 135.
32 Staudinger/Hausmann (see Note 8), paragraph 25.
33 Ibid., paragraph 26.
34 Calliess/Renner (see Note 15), p. 323, paragraph 20, with further references.
35 European Max Planck Group (editor: P. Torremans). Confl ict of Laws in Intellectual Property: The CLIP Principles and 
Commentary. Oxford University Press 2013, paragraph 3:902.C03.
36 See, for example, G. Kegel, K. Schurig (see Note 19), section 16 V; Palandt/Thorn (see Note 16), paragraph 4; D. Bureau, 
H. Muir Watt (see Note 15), p. 543; Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), paragraph 144.
37 C.K. Allen. Law in the Making, 7th edition. Oxford University Press 1964, p. 155.
38 Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), paragraph 146.
39 For the division of phases, see Note 15.
40 Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), paragraph 155. In some doctrines, the concept of relativity has been divided into relativity 
in a narrower sense, proximity, and seriousness of the breach – see, for instance, A. Mills. The dimensions of public policy 
in private international law. – Journal of Private International Law 2008/4, p. 210 ff.
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3.1. Territorial relativity or proximity 
The forum proximity (räumlice Relativität or Inlandsbeziehung, as it is referred to in German legal writing) 
requirement follows already from the wording of Article 21, as the provision itself makes reference to the 
forum state. Therefore, only in cases wherein there is a suffi ciently strong connection between the case and 
the forum’s legal order can it be justifi ed that the private international law rules and private autonomy shall 
be set aside in favour of domestic fundamental principles.
Article 21 does not, other than in mentioning the forum state, contain any reference as would aid in 
determining the degree of connection that is necessary for invoking the public policy exception.*41 In con-
trast, it is conceivable that the overriding mandatory provisions, as regulated in Article 9 of Rome I, include 
a reference to the necessary degree of the required connection in their proper wording, which would  simplify 
their application.*42 
The various factors of help in determining the proximity of the forum state to the specifi c case include 
personal and factual circumstances, alongside the legal considerations. It seems justifi ed to rely fi rst and 
foremost on criteria that are, taken individually, used in private international law to designate the law appli-
cable to contracts, such as the domicile or nationality*43 of the persons concerned. The existence of these 
factors should, in principle, suffi ce to establish per se the proximity requirement in a given case. Obviously, 
other important points of reference may either give weight to or, inversely, counterbalance those factors, 
with examples including the person’s cultural and legal connections to the forum country or another coun-
try such as his language skills, registration of permanent address, place of birth, or company domicile.*44 
In contrast, the jurisdiction of the court seised of the case is, by itself, insuffi cient to establish the proximity 
requirement. The latter could be envisaged only in exceptional cases of serious violations of fundamental 
rights or where internationally recognised principles are at stake.*45
Consequently, in order to justify invoking public policy, an issue-by-issue approach is needed. Whether 
the existence of a particular criterion or several combined criteria is suffi cient to establish the proxim-
ity requirement depends on the circumstances of the case and is to be determined ad hoc.*46 In addition, 
the material substance of the foreign legal norm involved and the seriousness of the breach are important 
factors in determination of the necessary degree of the connection – a blatant violation of domestic con-
ceptions of justice requires a less intense link between the facts of the case and the forum state, and vice 
versa.*47 The question of establishing the suffi cient-proximity requirement is even more multifaceted in 
the context of Europeanisation of the concept of public policy. Given that ordre public may also comprise 
principles derived from international sources, determination of the required substantive connection with 
the forum state may have to be treated differently when fundamental principles of cross-border origin are 
at stake. The latter apply, for example, in cases wherein the lex contractus is the law of a state other than an 
EU member state and a suffi ciently strong connection with the EU forum state is not established. If Euro-
pean fundamental values constitute the public policy concern in the case, a substantive connection to the 
internal market should be considered suffi cient for fulfi lment of the proximity requirement.*48
41 A specifi c proximity requirement can, for instance, be found expressis verbis in the Belgian Code of Private International 
Law, according to which, in determination of any incompatibility with public policy, special consideration is given to the 
degree to which the situation is connected with the domestic legal order and to the signifi cance of the consequences pro-
duced by the application of the foreign law. – Code de droit international privé du 16 juillet 2004 (Belgian Code of Private 
International Law of 16 July 2004), Article 21, II. English text available at http://www.ipr.be/data/B.WbIPR%5BEN%5D.
pdf (most recently accessed on 25 March 2015).
42 For in-depth analysis of the proximity requirement for overriding mandatory provisions, see R. Piir (see Note 7), paragraphs 
3.1 and 3.2.2.
43 Even though nationality as a determinant of the applicable law is losing its importance in the course of harmonisation of 
private international law in the EU, it could certainly be considered an important factor in establishment of the proximity 
requirement, given that the national has preserved connections to the state of his nationality.
44 For more details, see Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 186 ff.; Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), 
paragraph 158 ff.
45 Calliess/Renner (see Note 15), p. 329, paragraph 38; Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), paragraph 155.
46 Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 190; G. Kegel, K. Schurig (see Note 19), section 16 II.
47 A. Mills (see Note 40), p. 211; Palandt/Thorn (see Note 16), paragraph 6. For similar reasoning in German jurisprudence, 
see, for instance, this ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice, or Bundesgerichtshof: 4.06.1992. – BGHZ 118, 312/349.
48 M. Stürner (see Note 10), p. 481; see also Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 193; Staudinger/Voltz 
(see Note 20), paragraph 160.
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3.2. Temporal and material relativity
The proximity requirement is supplemented by temporal and material considerations that are also intrinsic 
to public policy. 
Temporal relativity (in German legal culture, zeitliche Relativität) means that in order for one to invoke 
public policy, the circumstances of the case must comprise a connection of a certain degree with the present 
time. In other words, it is necessary to evaluate the impact on the current legal and value system of applying 
foreign law to the case at hand.*49 Given that the concept of public policy is determined at the time of the 
court decision, it is also at this point that the evaluation of whether and to what extent the circumstances 
are connected to the present must be carried out. Under the interdependency discussed above, the stronger 
the impact of the result of applying foreign law on the present or future, the more likely public policy is to 
be invoked. In contrast, in cases wherein mainly past issues that have already been drawn to a conclusion 
are concerned, the public policy exception is to be applied only with due caution.*50
In keeping with the material relativity (in German, sachliche Relativität) of public policy, the consid-
eration of whether the undue result of applying foreign law is associated with the main issue of the dis-
pute or, instead, only a preliminary matter is also to be taken into account.*51 In principle, as long as only 
preliminary matters are at issue, the application of the public policy exception should remain rather rare, 
as preliminary questions determine the existence or the single effects of legal relationships as opposed to 
establishing legal relationships in the forum state. Their material connection to the forum state is, there-
fore, considerably weaker, although, that having been said, it depends also on the type of preliminary ques-
tion at hand and its signifi cance for the whole case. It is quite imaginable, therefore, that even though the 
application of foreign law with regard to a preliminary question leads to an unacceptable result, the overall 
result of the dispute can be considered acceptable.*52 
4. Conclusions
It follows from the above analyses that, in consequence of imposing a high substantive threshold, Article 
21 of Rome I is likely to come into play rather infrequently, as should be the case. Accordingly, it is submit-
ted that the public policy clause continues to function more as a safety net for general confl ict rules, also 
referred to as a relief valve*53 or even as an emergency brake before an excursus into the depths of a foreign 
law,*54 rather than a frequently invoked necessity. Nevertheless, on account of the continuous changes in 
society, this exceptional clause is expected to maintain its importance even within the domain of interna-
tional contracts. It can therefore be predicted that the public policy exception will, no matter its very restric-
tive application criteria, retain its scope of application for matters of contractual obligations. 
The public policy exception will remain essential particularly for reason of its relativity, allowing equi-
table results to be achieved even in cases unforeseen by legislators. The regulation of public policy in Rome 
I constitutes an abstract and fl exible instrument, exactly as it should, in order to retain its applicability in 
exceptional cases, allowing for prevention of possible violations of domestic fundamental values and to 
respond adequately to a changing society. It is important to bear in mind, however, the exceptional nature 
of this clause, in order to guarantee that, in practice, it is ‘only a fundamental clash of concepts […that] can 
ignite the spark of public policy’.*55
49 Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), paragraph 165; Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 202 ff.
50 G. Kegel, K. Schurig (see Note 19), section 16 V.
51 Münchener Kommentar / von Hein (see Note 14), paragraph 191.
52 Staudinger/Voltz (see Note 20), paragraph 166.
53 C. von Bar, P. Mankowski. Internationales Privatrecht, 1, 2nd edition. Munich: C. H. Beck 2003, p. 714. 
54 K. Siehr. Internationales Privatrecht. Heidelberg, Germany: C. F. Müller Verlag 2001, p. 490.
55 M.S. Abdel Wahab. The law applicable to technology transfer contracts - Egypt. – Yearbook of Private International Law 
2010/12, p. 467 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783866539488.457.
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